25 November Monday
Economic Notes

The 99 Per Cent Failure!

Surajit MazumdarUpdated: Thursday Jan 4, 2018

IN assessing the impact of the Modi  government’s demonetisation measure  on the black economy, the fact that  nearly 99 per cent of the outlawed  currency came back to the RBI has  been widely taken to indicate that the  measure was a failure – its costs far  outweighing any benefits. The obvious  reason for this is that the return of  almost all the notes establishes the  fact that hardly any black wealth was  destroyed as its immediate direct  outcome. Clearly the government had  expected a different result and that is  the only reason why the Reserve Bank  of India (RBI) took nearly eight months  to confirm to the public what it knew  by the end of December 2016. The  attorney general had told the Supreme  Court that the government had  expected that only Rupees 10-11 lakh  crores would be returned. A campaign  had also gone around about the benefits  that would flow to the public from the  ‘gain’ to the RBI and the government  of the Rs 4-5 lakh crores that would be  extinguished by not being returned and  converted into valid modes of payment. 

Having failed to achieve the  dramatic result that was expected to  add to the government’s propaganda  arsenal – the finance minister was  seen clutching at straws after the RBI’s  announcement, trying to convert the  failure into a success. The claim made  was that deposits of the notes had laid  the foundation for future benefits as  the anonymity associated with cash  had been undone – more illicit incomes  would be revealed, the tax base widened  and greater tax revenue generated. He  failed to note, however, that the return  of almost all the currency in circulation  also said something about the prospects  of such future benefits. 

It was known even before the  demonetisation announcement that  only a small part of black income  earned, or black wealth accumulated,  up to that point, would have been  held on November 8, 2016 in the form  cash by their beneficiaries. For one,  there was the empirical fact that there  simply wasn’t enough currency around  in relation to the supposed size of the  black economy for it to be otherwise.  The currency in circulation was about  12 per cent of one year’s national  income and less than 5 per cent of the  total household wealth. If the amount  of black income generated annually  and the amount of wealth accumulated  through it were large parts of their  respective totals, then clearly the  proportions in the form of currency had  to be relatively small. This was also not  surprising but to be expected. Money is  made to be spent and not held on to –  even if the objective is simply to make  more money rather than consuming it,  or to ‘save’ for the future. For anyone  not consuming immediately his or her  current income but keeping it aside –  currency would be the least preferable  form for such addition to wealth.  Currency does not earn any return and  with rising prices tends to lose value. 

It follows from the above that even  if the beneficiaries of black or illicit  incomes taken together were to lose all  their existing cash holdings because  of demonetisation, it would amount to  a one-time loss of a small magnitude  relative to their past and prospective  earnings and accumulated wealth. The  demonetisation measure presented  such people with four choices:  The first was to suffer fully the  one-time loss of losing their illegal  wealth held in the form of currency.  This is a choice they would have made  if this loss was expected to be less than  the immediate and future financial  and non-financial loss/penalties they  would have to bear by revealing these  holdings and drawing the attention of  tax authorities to themselves and their  incomes. In other words, the expected  costs of surrendering the “anonymity  associated with cash” had to be more  than the loss that would be suffered  by simply destroying the outlawed  500 and 1000 rupee notes held. Clearly  there were not too many people who  thought this would be the case and that  is why all the currency ended up being  deposited!  The second choice was to reveal  their cash holdings but take advantage  of the amnesty scheme announced  soon after demonetisation, the Pradhan  Mantri Garib Kalyan Yojna (PMGKY).  The advantage of this over the first  option would be that the one-time loss  could have been somewhat reduced,  but at the same cost of revealing  information on illegal income to tax  authorities that would have a bearing  on future earnings. We know, however,  that the response to the PMGKY has  been very poor with just Rs 4900 crores  (or less than 0.03 per cent of the total  currency deposits) being declared  through it. In other words, very little  of black income or wealth came to be  revealed through this route.  The third and final choice was to  simply deposit all the cash holdings  into their own bank accounts as those  without illegal incomes would, or into  accounts of ‘trusted’ associates willing  to do this favour and not anticipating  getting into trouble themselves by  doing so. This third choice would be  exercised by those who expected the  resultant immediate and future losses  to be too little in relation to the value  of cash held – that is if they were  confident that the tax authorities  would not be able to impose heavy  penalties on them or extract significant  amount of additional tax in the future  based on the information that would  become available to them through such  deposits. Is this the choice that was  favoured by most beneficiaries of illicit  incomes?  If almost all the currency held by  them was deposited by the public with  banks, then it must be true that no one  really feared that the effective total of  current and future costs resulting from  depositing their currency holding would  be more than what was deposited.  For those who had no unaccounted  incomes, this would always have been  true – there was no possibility of any  additional tax burden or penalty arising  for them from depositing of their cash  holdings with banks. One part of the  total deposit of Rs 15.28 lakh crores  came from such people – that part  was certainly not insignificant and if  it accounted for most of the deposits  then clearly very little of the currency  deposited was ‘black’. We may not know  yet the exact magnitude of the balance  which originated in illicit incomes. We  can be certain, however, that it must  be well below 15.28 lakh crores, which  is itself, as mentioned earlier, much  less than the black incomes generated  annually and accumulated the black  wealth. Those who deposited that  ‘black’ part, almost without exception  it seems, revealed by their own actions  that they do not anticipate paying,  over several years in the future, more  additional taxes than that amount. In  effect, therefore, they confidently voted  with their money against the finance  minister’s claim that the supposed  loss of their anonymity would lead to  significantly greater tax revenues in the  future. Doesn’t this almost unanimous  opinion among the ‘experts’ at hiding  incomes and evading taxes, arrived at  without any explicit coordination, tell  us something about what is likely to  happen? If some more evidence was  needed, here it is. Apparently taken in  by the rhetoric of demonetisation, the  finance minister had budgeted for a 25  per cent rise in income tax revenues in  2017-18 compared to the previous year.  Till November 2017, eight months into  the financial year, the actual increase  compared to the same period of the  previous year has been just over 15  per cent. Even on this count thus, the  country waits for the elusive achhe din  to arrive!   

 Top